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So much effort has gone into dusting Husserl off in order to make him fit for con-
temporary debate. Specifically, the dust of classical german philosophy—‘idea-
lism’ for short—had to come off. Kantian dust was particularly irritating because 
it drew attention to Husserl’s transcendental idealism, which was unfashionable—
even amongst Husserlians—from its inception. a good look at both Kant and Hus-
serl, however, shows that this is nothing to fear. if anything, a comparison with Kant 
bolsters Husserl’s realism, helps one understand the distinctiveness of his transcen-
dental idealism, and highlights Husserl’s methodological commitment to the sole 
justificatory power of phenomenological evidence.
in this article i initially focus on just one aspect of the complex systematic re-
lation between Kant and Husserl: their notions of sensible representation ( sinn-
liche Vorstellung). in my reading, i agree with realist interpretations of Kant and 
Husserl, which have been put forward against charges of representationalism in 
both fields independently from each other. by ‘representationalism’, i mean the 
construal of mind-world relations as relations between internal representations to 
external objects (ameriks, 2000; rockmore, 2007).1 in a second section, i argue 
that the realism implied by Kant’s and Husserl’s anti-representationalism should 
not surprise us but rather be expected as integral to the project of transcendental 
idealism. obviously, the real task is to provide a coherent and comprehensive un-
derstanding of transcendental idealism in both Kant and Husserl given their strong 
realism. my task in this paper is a smaller one, namely to clarify those aspects of 
their transcendental idealisms that are directly relevant to their accounts of (sensib-
le) representation.
1 ‘representationalism’ as i refer to it here is closely related to more specific theories that also 
think of object reference as an indirect process mediated by representations of some sort, such as 
phenomenalism and sense data realism. other senses of ‘representationalism’ are in circulation, 
both in philosophy of mind and in the cognitive sciences, but those are not considered here.
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1  Representations and Representationalism  
in Kant and Husserl
any innocent use of the term ‘representation’ is no longer possible insofar the issue 
of ‘representationalism’ (or its younger cousin, ‘internalism’) is immediately raised 
along with it. both Kant and Husserl are obviously representationalists in the trivial 
sense that they use the notion of ‘representation ( Vorstellung)’. in the less trivial, 
but still very broad sense, they both believe that there is no access or knowledge of 
the world as it is ‘in itself’, independent from how it can be experienced, or ‘repre-
sented’ (although their interpretations of this claim diverge significantly from each 
other). the question is whether this makes them advocates of representationalism in 
the substantive sense that is at issue here, namely the position that access to external 
objects is at best indirect, mediated by internal representations. because contem-
porary debates surrounding anti-representationalism mainly concern perception, 
what is required for settling this question is a proper understanding of Kant’s and 
Husserl’s notions of sensible (sinnliche) or intuitive (anschauliche) representation.2
1.1  Kant’s Anti-representationalist Notion of Sensible 
Representation
‘representation’, the most basic term in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, was, 
under the name ‘idea’, one of the most central notions of seventieth and eightieth 
century philosophical discourse. by the time Kant was developing his own account, 
the notion that the mind related to the world indirectly, through a ‘veil of ideas’ (if 
at all), and the particular conception of ideas as images held considerable ground in 
both rationalist and empiricist quarters—not only in britain but also in germany. 
Kant’s redefinition of an ‘idea’ as a concept “surpassing the possibility of experien-
ce” (KrV, a 320/b 377), and thus as being nothing like an image, must therefore be 
understood as part of Kant’s break with the standard view of his time.
Kant preserves the generic sense of the term ‘idea’ in the equally generic term 
‘representation’, but denies that sensible representations are, or are like, images 
( Bilder). Instead, Kant describes them as ‘intuitions ( Anschauungen)’. Far from 
being a terminological quibble, Kant’s rejection of any ‘image theory’ and his in-
troduction of a theory of intuitions again marks his departure from both german 
and british ‘ways of ideas’ in at least two important respects. First, the equation of 
sensible representations with images strongly encourages the view that they are pas-
sively received, so to speak ‘ready-made’. Kant, however, maintains that intuitions 
are generated in complex syntheses, and hence require an active mind. Second, it 
strongly encourages the view that they replace external objects as direct objects of 
2 neither Kant nor Husserl simply equates sensible or intuitive representation with perception. 
this can get lost in translation when one considers them in the context of contemporary debates, 
which are usually concerned with perception in particular.
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awareness. Kant, on the contrary, maintains that intuitions constitute an immediate 
reference to the objects given in them.
in the Critique of Pure Reason one thus finds close to no references to images. 
Perhaps the most famous exception is the passage in the transcendental deduction 
of the first edition, where Kant argues for the claim that intuitions are not passively 
received but actively synthesized by the mind. By ‘perceptions ( Wahrnehmungen)’ 
Kant here means ‘conscious intuitions’:
but because every appearance contains a manifold, so that different perceptions are in 
themselves encountered in the mind sporadically and individually, these perceptions need 
to be given a combination that in sense itself they cannot have. Hence there is in us an active 
power to synthesize this manifold. this power we call imagination [...]. For the imagination 
is to bring the manifold of intuition into one image [...]. (KrV, a 120)
in the footnote to this passage, Kant underscores his sweeping criticism of the 
available theories of perception,
[…] partly because this power (i.e., the imagination) has been limited [...] to reproduction 
only, and partly because they believed that the senses not only supply us with impressions, 
but indeed also assemble these impressions and thus bring about images of objects. (KrV, 
a 120 n.)
Kant uses the term ‘image’ in order to indicate those theories of perception that 
fail. the degree to which he is committed to a non-imagistic account of intuition 
is impressively illustrated by the vehemence with which he reacts against his critic 
Johann a. eberhard:
Where have i ever called intuitions of space and time (which first of all make images possi-
ble) themselves images [...]? He [eberhard] has so internalized the deceptive automatism of 
using the expression pictorial [bildlich] instead of sensible [sinnlich] that it always remains 
with him. (ak, 8, p. 222)
For Kant, sensibility is not a purely passive readiness to receive images through the 
senses, but includes, under the name of the power of the imagination ( Einbildungs-
kraft), the active capacity to take up and synthesize incoming sense data.3 intuitions 
are the products of such syntheses, which, unlike images, are characterized by the 
immediacy with which they refer “directly to the object” (KrV, a 320/b 377; cf. a 
19/b 33 and passim). as the german term literally says, an intuition is not ‘some-
thing looked at’ (‘etwas Angeschautes’), but constitutes a ‘looking at’ (‘eine An-
schauung’), namely a ‘looking at’ an object.4
and yet, the view that intuitions are themselves products of (mental) syntheses 
appears to confirm, even radicalize, a representationalist reading of Kant insofar as 
it has been taken to suggest a constructivist position.5 However, the use of the term 
3 Kant assigns this synthesis to the imagination although he attributes its transcendentality to an 
‘effect of the understanding’ on inner sense (KrV, b 152).
4 this is obviously not meant to suggest that every intuition is a veridical perception of a real 
object. Whether the object presented in intuition is real, is a matter of judgment for Kant, and an 
intuition need not be a perception but could, for exemple, be an imagination, hallucination, etc.
5 tom rockmore, for example, speaks of Kant’s ‘constructivism’, namely “the view that a nec-
essary condition of knowledge is that the knower construct, constitute, make, or produce its 
cognitive object” (rockmore, 2007, p. 9).
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‘constructivism’ is problematic—above all because it invites confusion between 
empirical and transcendental senses of synthesis. an empirical misunderstanding of 
the transcendental synthesis easily leads to a representationalist view which Kant 
does not adopt. However, due to this misunderstanding, this view has long been 
considered the standard interpretation, and still finds powerful advocates today. 
this view involves the idea that intuitions (often considered as ‘raw’ sense data) 
are, in a first step of passive reception, given in a purely spatial and temporal order 
(whatever that may be), and then, in a second step of construction, subjected to the 
categories.6 Such an empirical doctrine of representations simply cannot capture 
the upshot of Kant’s transcendental account that considers a representation not only 
as something one apprehends (as itself an object of inner sense) but something 
in virtue of which one apprehends an object (of outer sense). the whole point of 
Kant’s notion of a transcendental synthesis of the imagination—understood as an 
influence of the understanding on inner sense—is to explain the necessity of what 
in experience is only observable as a contingent fact: that in conscious intuitions 
we are always given objects (or, to be more precise, we are always given undeter-
mined appearances that are determinable in judgments as objects), and not mere 
sensations.
moreover, the very plausibility of such an empirical doctrine of representa-
tions is itself largely based on a further confusion of empirical and transcendental 
levels of analysis. it ‘naturally’ follows from an empirical reading of claims re-
peatedly made by Kant, that appearances are ‘mere representations’ and, as such, 
‘in us’. in the empirical sense of the expression, this would distinguish things ‘in 
us’ (understood as internal representations) from things ‘outside us’ (understood 
as external objects). However, in Kant’s transcendental sense of the expression, 
it distinguishes things not distinct from us (and our ways of cognizing them) from 
things distinct from us (and our ways of cognizing them); that is, it distinguishes 
things as appearances from things in themselves (cf. allison, 2004; allais, 2011, 
p. 384). i say more about the impact of this distinction on Kant’s notion of realism 
below, but its impact on Kant’s anti-representationalist theory of intuitions is alrea-
dy clear: due to Kant’s distinction between the empirical and the transcendental 
senses of the expression, it holds without contradiction that objects of outer sense 
6 this is, of course, not to deny that intuition “takes place only insofar as the object is given to us” 
and that this “is possible only [...] by the mind’s being affected in a certain manner” (KrV, a 19/b 
33). it is just to make the point that, for Kant, the mind’s sensibility is not merely passive but in 
virtue of the imagination also spontaneous. contrary to representationalisms that, as rorty (1979) 
famously put it, consider the mind’s sensibility a passive ‘mirror of nature’, Kant’s transcendental 
idealism involves the claim that the way objects are given to us in intuition is already under the “ef-
fect of the understanding” (rorty, of course, misses that both Kant and Husserl reject a ‘mirroring’ 
representationalism.) to call the synthesis of the imagination that is the “first application” (KrV, b 
152) of the understanding’s effect on sensibility “transcendental” is also to say that the mind does 
not, in a first step, merely receive sensations, and then, in a second step, empirically synthesize 
them into intuitions. the same empirical fallacy is committed by interpretations that locate the 
second step not in the imagination but in judgement (for the most recent attempt see abela, 2002). 
it is committed by any interpretation that involves a theory of two steps and thus turns Kant’s 
transcendental theory into the description of an empirical process.
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are both (empirically) ‘outside us’ and (transcendentally) ‘in us’, i.e., they are both 
external and mind-dependent.
in conclusion, intuitions are, as derk Pereboom puts it, “immediate awarenes-
ses” of objects (Pereboom, 1988, pp. 326, 338). this holds both for empirical intui-
tions, which are our immediate awarenesses of empirical objects (of outer or inner 
sense), and for pure intuitions, which are our immediate awarenesses of formal 
objects (of space or time as objects). the fact that Kant is still accused of advancing 
a representationalist theory of representations betrays the force the post-cartesian 
legacy of the ‘way of ideas’ continues to hold over debates in philosophy of mind, 
consciousness and cognition more generally. it is also symptomatic of a persisting 
confusion of empirical and transcendental levels of analysis, which continues to ob-
scure the radicality with which Kant reconfigured the post-cartesian philosophical 
landscape once and for all.
1.2  Husserl’s Anti-representationalist Notion of Representation
at the time when Husserl began to form his phenomenological critique of cognition, 
it was, despite the collapse of german idealism, still de rigueur to phrase issues in 
terms of representations ( Vorstellungen). the language of representations was ber-
nard bolzano’s, Wilhelm Wundt’s, Franz brentano’s and carl Stumpf’s language. it 
was, of course, the language of neo-Kantianism, but, due to the translation of ‘idea’ 
as ‘Vorstellung’, it was also the (german) language of british empiricism. amongst 
all the influences that had an impact on Husserl, brentano was, at least initially, 
the strongest. in opposition to “Kant’s decadent position” (Körner, 1987, p. 11), 
brentano advocated a return to pre-Kantian (aristotelian, Scholastic and cartesian) 
notions of representation. this set the scene for Husserl, and probably goes some 
way in explaining why he had to fight the same battles against representationalism 
as Kant had two hundred years earlier.
despite the ubiquity of ‘representation’ in the philosophical and psychological 
discourse of his day, Husserl observed the lack of consensus in its use and meaning. 
in the Logical Investigations, Husserl counts no less than thirteen different senses 
of ‘representation’ (5th inv., § 44). His is a very broad understanding of the term; all 
consciousness is a case of ‘representing’ ( Vorstellen) (2nd inv., § 23). conscious-
ness in its broadest sense, he writes, is “a comprehensive designation for ‘mental 
acts’, or ‘intentional experiences [Erlebnisse]’”, i.e., representations, “of all sorts” 
(5th inv.: Hua XiX/1, § 1, p. 356). However, by characterizing representations as 
‘lived through ( erlebte)’ acts of consciousness, Husserl rejects brentano’s and, for 
that matter, any other notion of representations as ‘internal objects’ or ‘psycholo-
gical entities’. in opposition to such theories, Husserl considers representations as 
modes of being conscious of something, i.e., as modes of intentionality (for exam-
ple, ‘perceptual representation’ is ‘perceptual consciousness’, ‘phantasy represen-
tation ( Phantasievorstellung)’ is ‘phantasy consciousness’, etc.). in short, even for 
the early Husserl, having a representation of a particular kind (e.g., an intuitive re-
presentation) is being conscious of an object in a particular mode (e.g., intuitively).
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With his distinction between intuitive presentations and signitive (or symbolic) 
representations, Husserl reappropriates the Kantian distinction between intuitions 
and concepts. intuitive representations are sensory or quasi-sensory representations, 
e.g, perceptions, memories, phantasies. Having intuitive representations means 
intuiting (e.g., seeing, touching, hearing, etc.) objects in their spatio-temporal spe-
cifications and with their determining sensible (visual, haptic, audial etc.) features. 
Husserl, like Kant, considers them immediate, albeit not necessarily veridical, 
awarenesses of actual objects, which are thus given ‘in the flesh’ or ‘in person’.7 
intuitions, in this sense, are thus precisely not internal objects that mediate our ex-
perience of the world. rather, they are our experiences of external, or, in Husserl’s 
language, ‘transcendent’ objects, i.e., of objects that are different from us and our 
mental states. accordingly, already in the Logical Investigations Husserl forcefully 
condemns the theory of internal objects as “one of the worst conceptual distortions 
known to philosophy” which “is without doubt responsible for an untold legion of 
epistemological and psychological errors” (2nd inv.: Hua XiX/1, § 23, p. 170). in 
an appendix to the fifth investigation, which is unambiguously entitled “critique of 
the ‘image theory’ and of the doctrine of the ‘immanent’ objects of acts”, Husserl 
makes it perfectly clear “that the intentional object of a representation is the same as 
its actual object, and on occasion as its external object, and that it is absurd to dis-
tinguish between them.” (5th inv., appendix to § 11 and § 20: Hua XiX/1, p. 439).
in Husserl’s view, as long as “one deals with mental processes as ‘contents’ or as 
psychical ‘elements’ which are still regarded as bits of things [Sächelchen]” ( Ideas I: 
Hua iii/1, § 112, p. 253), no progress towards an adequate theory of con-
sciousness can be made. thus Husserl (like Kant) rejects an empirical doctrine of 
representations and considers a representation not as something one apprehends 
(as itself an object, a ‘Sächelchen’), but as something in virtue of which one ap-
prehends an object. in Ideas I, in the context of an explicitly transcendental anal-
ysis, Husserl speaks of a relation between ‘transcendental’ (i.e., constituting) con-
sciousness and a ‘transcendent’ (i.e., constituted) object. in the case of perceptual 
consciousness, Husserl claims, this object is nothing other than the ‘physical thing’ 
perceived, which simply “cannot be given in any possible perception as something 
really [reell] inherently immanent,” but is “in itself, unqualifiedly transcendent” 
(Hua iii/1, § 42, p. 87). again, Husserl (like Kant) rejects an empirical idea of per-
ceptual objects as ‘mere representations’ as ‘really inherently immanent’ (‘in us’). 
in his transcendental sense of the expression, ‘intentional objects’ refers to things 
that are not distinct from us (and our ways of cognizing them); that is, it refers to 
transcendent things insofar as they stand in a relation to consciousness.
With his transcendental standpoint in place, Husserl begins to avoid the term 
‘representation’, which is so difficult to divest of empirical confusions, and replaces 
it with a pair of technical terms that are meant to capture both the subjective and 
the objective moments of intentionality: ‘noesis’ (the act of intention) and ‘noema’ 
7 Image-consciousness ( Bildbewusstsein) is the exception because it, unlike perception and other 
intuitive representations, is, as the title already indicates, mediated by an image. Husserl’s anti-re-
presentationalist account is in part driven by the contrast with image-consciousness, which Husserl 
began working on in the late 1890ies (Hua XXiii).
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(the object as it is intended). and yet, the noema, no less than the old-fashioned 
‘representation’, has motivated representationalist interpretations. the contentious 
issue is Husserl’s distinction between the noema and the intended object. in Ideas I 
he famously writes:
the tree simpliciter, the thing in nature, could not be more different from the perceived tree 
as such that, as perceptual sense, inseparably belongs to the perception. the tree simpliciter 
can burn down, can be reduced to its chemical elements, etc. but the sense—the sense of 
this perception, something that necessarily belongs to its essential being—can not burn 
down. (Hua iii/1, § 89, p. 205)
Husserl thereby returns to a distinction that he already makes in the Logical Inves-
tigations, namely a distinction “between the object tout court [schlechthin], which 
is intended on a given occasion, and the object as it is then intended” (5th inv.: Hua 
XiX/1, § 17, p. 414). this distinction is often interpreted as a clear expression of 
Husserl’s representationalism because it appears to posit the noema as a third entity 
between consciousness and the ‘object tout court’. However, the following passage 
can also be found in Ideas I:
i perceive the physical thing, the object belonging to nature, the tree there in the garden; 
that and nothing else is the actual object of the perceptual ‘intention.’ a second immanen-
tal tree, or even an ‘internal image’ of the actual tree standing out there before me, is in 
no way given, and to suppose that hypothetically leads to an absurdity. (Hua iii/1, § 90, 
pp. 207–208)
Here Husserl affirms the identity of the noema with the intended object—a view 
that can be described as anti-representationalist in the sense in which i have been 
using it.
the apparent conflict between the two passages is again due to a confusion of 
empirical and transcendental levels of analysis.8 When Husserl speaks of an inflam-
mable ‘tree simpliciter’ and opposes it to the non-inflammable ‘sense’ of its per-
ception, he makes the empirical distinction between a ‘thing in itself’, i.e., a thing 
considered independently from its appearance to a consciousness, and an ‘intentio-
nal object’, i.e., a thing considered in its relation to consciousness (in the ‘sense’ it 
has for consciousness). in transcendental analysis, however, the object of analysis 
is not the tree as physical thing but the same tree as an object for consciousness. 
its transcendental analysis does not say anything about its physical properties (e.g., 
whether it is inflammable or not), but investigates the tree as it is given in conscious 
experience (the tree as noema). this neither denies the existence of the physical tree 
nor posits the existence of the noema as a new third ‘intensional’ entity between 
consciousness and object. it simply clarifies the complexity of what, in natural ana-
lysis, we consider ‘ordinary perception’.
there is, then, also a transcendental-phenomenological sense of a ‘thing itself’. 
any perception of a real tree includes both the awareness of different profiles of the 
tree (due to different angles, different lighting conditions, etc.) and, at the same time, 
the awareness of these different profiles as different profiles of the same tree, which 
8 this confusion also results in the conflicting ‘east coast’ and ‘West coast’ interpretations of the 
noema; the former is a transcendental, the latter is an empirical reading.
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is thus irreducible to any specific sense in which it is presented and thus ‘transcen-
dent’ in the Husserlian sense. this complex experience of the tree, however, does 
not require an internal representation of the tree. the tree, as we experience it (the 
noema), is the same tree that we experience (the physical thing). as Sartre reminds 
us, Husserl does not think that this experience is ‘in consciousness’, but that we 
experience the tree “just where it is: at the side of the road, in the midst of the dust” 
(Sartre, 2002, p. 382). to construe perception as a case in which a noema is, so 
to speak, entertained while its reference is yet to be established is to commit not 
only “a mentalistic misinterpretation of the phenomenological dimension”, which 
misinterprets noemata “as part of the mental inventory” (Zahavi, 2004, p. 58), it is 
also to commit an empirical misinterpretation of a transcendental analysis, which 
misinterprets noemata as part of an empirical theory.
2  Direct Realism in Kant and Husserl: Some Essential 
Agreements and Disagreements
my claim that Kant and Husserl are anti-representationalists about sensible repre-
sentation commits both of them to the view that cognition is, in virtue of these 
representations, immediately related to objects, which are not themselves mere re-
presentations but, in a sense to be qualified, mind-independent. this reference to 
mind-independent objects constitutes the direct realism i thereby attribute to both 
of them. However, direct realism is usually understood—under the name of ‘naïve 
realism’—as a purely empirical, even commonsensical view, which, for Husserl, 
is characteristic of the ‘natural attitude’. clearly, neither Kant nor Husserl was a 
naïve realist. on the contrary, they both regarded themselves as transcendental ide-
alists. Hence, an anti-representationalist interpretation must show how it is com-
patible with their respective accounts of transcendental idealism, which is usually 
understood as the thesis that we only know objects as they appear to us, and not as 
they are in themselves. this claim is often used interchangeably with yet another 
one, namely that there are ‘for us’ no mind-independent objects but only appear-
ances.
Kant’s project of transcendental idealism was already suspected of being an or-
dinary idealism in new clothes before it could even get off the ground. the same 
suspicion now persists after more than two hundred years of scholarship, which has 
led Karl ameriks to refer to it as “a stray dog that refuses to go home” (ameriks, 
1996, p. 67). Husserl’s transcendental idealism has fared no better. many of Hus-
serl’s contemporary followers saw in his ‘dipping into idealism’ enough of a reason 
to turn away from their master. this disappointment lingers, as is evident from re-
cent demands for a final “break with any transcendental scheme” (romano, 2012, 
p. 444; romano, 2011, 19 f.). in a manner of speaking, there are thus two dogs on 
the loose, and it might prove more effective to pursue them together than in iso-
lation, especially because the lack of clarity regarding their relation tends to make 
it even more difficult to catch them. i contribute to this greater end in a small way 
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by focusing on direct implications of the anti-representationalist views i attribute to 
both Kant and Husserl.
2.1  Some Essential Agreements Concerning  
Transcendental Idealism
the most important agreement between Kant and Husserl is also what sets them 
apart from all other direct realists, both past and present, who fail to make a critical 
problem of their position, a problem whose explanation or clarification must be phi-
losophical, and not empirical, because any empirical explanation would have to rely 
on the very realism it is meant to explain or clarify.9 Since ‘philosophical’ is here 
opposed to ‘empirical’ or ‘natural’, this implies that the explanation or clarification 
sought must be in some sense a priori (which can be interpreted in different ways, 
e.g., as formal, material, ontological, or historical). i take it that this constitutes the 
‘transcendental stance’ in its most general form (which need not be Kantian or Hus-
serlian),10 and that it necessarily involves realism as its explanandum.11
However, while this ‘transcendental stance’ is, if i am right, a necessary charac-
teristic of Kantian and Husserlian philosophy, neither Kant nor Husserl are simply 
‘transcendentalists’, they are also idealists. Since ‘ideal’ is here opposed to ‘real’ in 
the broad sense of ‘objective’, this implies that they are committed to seeking the 
philosophical explanations or clarifications for their realist positions in ideal condi-
tions, where ‘ideal’ means, broadly speaking, ‘subjective’ (which can be interpreted 
in different ways, e.g., as mental, psychological, formal, or phenomenological). i 
take it that this constitutes idealism in its most general form (which need not be 
Kantian or Husserlian),12 and that it necessarily involves the reference to some such 
ideal conditions as its explanans.13
this is not to deny that it is possible to hold a ‘transcendentalist’ but not an 
idealist position (and vice versa), or that it is possible to hold either position in a 
generally ‘Kantian’ or ‘Husserlian’ way (i.e., in a way that is informed by Kant or 
Husserl, or both). it is to affirm that Kant’s and Husserl’s transcendental idealisms 
9 this means that it is possible to ‘naturalize’ phenomenology but impossible to do so without 
going against Husserl on this specific point, which is unproblematic as long as one is aware of it.
10 the list of ‘transcendentalists’ in this very broad sense could be surprisingly long and may 
include thinkers as varied as Plato, Karl marx, martin Heidegger, michel Foucault, Judith butler, 
mark rowlands and many others (whether it actually does is a contentious issue).
11 this explains to some extent Kant’s and Husserl’s frustration with the persistence of the idealism 
charges leveled against them. it also explains why the much more recent label of ‘anti-realism’ is, 
to put it mildly, misleading.
12 the list of idealists in this very broad sense is known to be long but is likely to exclude thinkers 
as varied as Plato, Karl marx, martin Heidegger, michel Foucault, Judith butler, mark rowlands 
and many others (whether it actually does is a contentious issue).
13 this explains to some extent the persistence of the idealism charges leveled against Kant and 
Husserl. it also explains why the much more recent label of ‘anti-realism’ appears so appropriate.
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essentially involve both positions. However, this agreement, as i have presented 
it here, depends on further agreements, which are tacitly assumed and need to be 
made explicit. the first is that both Kant and Husserl consider ‘philosophical’ to 
be opposed to ‘empirical’ (or, to use Husserl’s term, ‘natural’). this reflects their 
shared belief that philosophy is concerned with (not only analytic) a priori judg-
ments, and thus with a ‘rigorous science’ that cannot be reduced to formal logic or 
empirical psychology (cf. Hua Vii, p. 287).
the second is that both Kant and Husserl consider ‘ideal’ to be opposed to ‘ob-
jective’, and hence as subjective. in this regard, they are both post-cartesians (rather 
than, for example, Platonists) and firmly rooted in a specifically modern paradigm; 
but they are also post-empiricists in that they always consider the subject in its 
relation to the world (and not as, for example, a soul with innate ideas, or a divine 
intellect). What makes Kant’s and Husserl’s transcendental idealist philosophies 
distinctive is the combination of these two assumptions. only in this combination 
lies the so-called ‘copernican revolution’, which maintains that (1) a priori truths 
about the world are intelligible, but that they are (2) only in relation to a subjectivity 
that experiences the world.14 However, one further qualification is needed.
none of the shared ‘assumptions’ are dogmatically adopted by either Kant or 
Husserl as assumptions. instead, they are critically adopted as working hypotheses 
(Fincham, 2011, p. 226).15 these are, for Kant, in need of final proof (his transcen-
dental deduction), and, for Husserl, in need of infinite demonstration in evidence 
(the continuous project of transcendental phenomenology). of these hypotheses, 
only the commitment to realism is substantial. it can be considered the most funda-
mental insofar as both Kant and Husserl think of this commitment as commonsen-
sical or ‘natural’. the task of critical philosophy, as they see it, is to ‘scientifically’ 
justify (Kant) or clarify (Husserl) realism, but not to skeptically consider it as actu-
ally ‘up for grabs’.16
the anti-representationalism operating in both Kant’s and Husserl’s accounts 
of sensible, or intuitive representations is in each case the result of an analysis that 
is based on the shared working hypotheses just laid out, that is, on ‘transcendental 
idealism’. What is often overlooked is that the different formulations of transcen-
dental idealism given by Kant or Husserl are to be read not as doctrines (which one 
14 Kant’s presentation of the copernican revolution already implies this since, according to the 
analogy he draws, the subject in question is an ‘observing’, i.e., experiencing subject, not a subject 
whose relation to the world first needs be established.
15 note that Kant calls the copernican revolution ‘an experiment’ (KrV, b XVi, XViii).
16 on the role of common sense in Kant see ameriks, 2000.—this explains why Kant sees no 
need for a separate ‘refutation of idealism’ in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason but 
only adds it in the second edition, in response to charges of idealism leveled against him after the 
publication of the first edition. both Kant and Husserl claim that although we could be wrong 
individually about any judgment in which, on the basis of perception, we attribute existence to 
a thing; we could not be wrong collectively about the existence of perceivable things in general. 
even Husserl, who does not attempt and does not consider possible a ‘refutation of idealism’ in the 
form of a logical argument, simply considers the evidence for their (collective) existence so over-
whelming that he deems the skeptical position ‘counter-sensical’ ( widersinnig).
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assents to when one, so to speak, decides to become a transcendental idealist),17 but 
as explanations or clarifications that result from transcendental idealism as a work-
ing hypothesis. after all, as lucy allais has pointed out, to “distinguish between 
things as they appear to us and things as they are in themselves is not necessarily 
idealist, neither is arguing that we cannot have knowledge of mind-independent 
reality” (allais, 2004, p. 669). and, i would like to add, either view can be held 
without taking a transcendental stance.
if the results of transcendental idealism (understood as a critical hypothesis) 
are read in reference to a transcendental stance from whose perspective alone they 
are rendered valid, then one and the same analysis may include different, even 
conflicting results, which are compossible as long as one distinguishes between 
transcendental and empirical levels of analysis. thus there is nothing self-contra-
dictory in the fact that Kant’s transcendental idealism involves and indeed justifies 
the claim that, empirically speaking, things themselves appear and that, empirically 
speaking, we can have knowledge of mind-independent reality (as he himself points 
out, e.g. see KrV, a 29/b 45). at the same time, two analyses that adopt the critical 
hypothesis of transcendental idealism may have very different, even conflicting re-
sults if they employ very different methods. thus there is nothing problematic in the 
fact that Husserl’s transcendental idealism, in contradiction to Kant’s, involves the 
claim that things themselves appear and that we can have knowledge of mind-in-
dependent reality (under the methodological proviso that this is evident only ‘under 
the phenomenological and eidetic variations’).
i consider the parallels i identify above between Kant and Husserl as the most 
essential. there are many others to be found in the details of their analyses (e.g., on 
time and space, on anti-representationalism, on the centrality of syntheses for con-
sciousness), which may be called ‘derivative’, insofar as they result from concrete 
philosophical investigations that otherwise follow very different methods and are 
thus given very different explanations of clarifications. the essential agreements 
that i see, with the possible exception of their shared commitment to realism, may 
be called ‘formal’ insofar as Kant and Husserl fill these agreements out in substan-
tially different ways, according to their respective methods.
2.2  Some Essential Disagreements Concerning Method
the most important disagreement between Kant and Husserl is methodological. it 
concerns the legitimate justification of a priori claims in general, and of philosophi-
cal claims in particular. For Kant, the justification of a priori claims is the business 
of “rational cognition” (KrV, a 837/b 865). Pure philosophy is “cognition from 
pure reason” (KrV, a 840/b 868) and legitimizes its claims “from concepts” (KrV, 
a 844/b 872). although he insists that cognition always requires contributions from 
17 this might be more obvious in the case of Husserl but it is helpful to recall that Kant does not 
want his ‘critique’ understood as a doctrine either (cf. KrV, a 11 f./b 25 f.).
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both sensibility and understanding, he believes that the necessity and universality of 
philosophical a priori claims can only be recognized by means of rational thinking, 
which he, of course, considers distinct from any mode of intuiting. in fact, he de-
fines an a priori judgment as “a proposition such that in thinking it we think at the 
same time its necessity” and “strict universality”, which “experience never pro-
vides” (KrV, b 3; my italics).
Husserl is opposed to the intellectualism of Kant’s method. instead, he deve-
lops a new ‘phenomenological’ method, based on the idea that even philosophical 
a priori truths cannot be justified by argument (i.e., ‘in thought’) alone, but must 
be brought to evidence in an ‘intellectual seeing’ (Hua iii/1, p. 317), e.g., an ei-
detic ‘seeing’ in which essential relations and invariances are grasped directly. by 
this criterion, philosophical arguments (Kant’s included) are ‘empty’ and lacking 
in justificatory power unless they can be supported by a ‘fulfilling’ experience, by 
‘evidence’ of an appropriate kind. nothing is ‘proven’ unless and until it is ‘shown’ 
with evidence, which Husserl describes “in an extremely broad sense” as an original 
“‘experiencing’ of something that is, and is thus” (Hua i, p. 52; see Hua iii/1, p. 1). 
in line with Wundt’s interpretation that “‘evidence’ is only a translation of ‘intui-
tiveness [Anschaulichkeit]’” (Wundt, 1906, p. 78), Husserl thus adopts an ‘extre-
mely broad sense’ of intuition, which is meant to capture this notion of evidence. 
on the basis of this very broad sense of intuition, Husserl’s phenomenology can be 
understood, albeit in phenomenological senses of the expressions, as philosophical 
‘intuitionism’, as ‘radical empiricism’ (Solomon, 2001, p. 146), or as ‘genuine po-
sitivism’ (Hua iii/1, § 20). it uses a justificatory principle—the “principle of prin-
ciples” (Hua iii/1, § 24)—that is obviously irreconcilable with Kant’s, with the re-
sult that, from Husserl’s perspective, Kant’s philosophy is replete with illegitimate 
claims, and vice versa.
there are too many further disagreements that follow from this for them to be 
listed here (or anywhere). However, many of them become intelligible in their in-
evitability if one keeps the fundamental methodological disagreement between Kant 
and Husserl in mind. to illustrate this, i now return to the anti-representationalist 
accounts of intuitive representation laid out in the first section. despite Kant’s and 
Husserl’s shared realism, some irreconcilable and inevitable differences can easily 
be identified. For example, it is integral to Kant’s account that the transcendental 
distinction between cognizable appearances and merely thinkable things in them-
selves be upheld (for reasons relating to Kant’s moral philosophy and his concep-
tions of god and faith). Within the framework of Husserl’s phenomenology, on the 
contrary, this same distinction is untenable (because it can only be thought and thus 
lacks any phenomenological evidence), not only on the level of empirical analysis, 
but also on the level of transcendental analysis. For Husserl, it is simply “nonsense 
[Unsinn] to base the being of a thing on a being that is in principle un-experiencable 
[unerfahrbar]” (Hua XXXVi, p. 32); it is an expression of “a dogmatic objectivism 
that deals with transcendent metaphysical suppositions” (Hua Vii, p. 369). Hence, 
he regards all appearances as the things themselves appearing (Hua iii/1, § 43).
Further, Kant is forced, by his own methodological and justificatory principles, 
to present a transcendental argument for his anti-representationalist account, which 
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is therefore inseparable from his notion of a transcendental synthesis of the imagi-
nation. it, and only it, explains that and why perceptions are always determinable by 
concepts, despite the fact that, for Kant, sensibility and understanding are distinct 
stems of cognition. Since this synthesis is required ( nötig), it is necessary ( notwen-
dig). Husserl, as is well known, rejects this argument, at least initially (under the 
influence of Friedrich albert lange’s materialist Kant interpretation), and also re-
jects the very idea of such a ‘creative (schöpferische) synthesis’ (Hua Xii, p. 39 ff.). 
only when it is cut from its origin in Kant’s faculty-psychology—in Husserl’s eyes, 
yet another illegitimate ‘mythical’ construct (Hua Vii, p. 401) that betrays Kant’s 
psychologism (Hua Vii, p. 402) and anthropologism (Hua iii/1, § 150)—and de-
scribed in phenomenological analysis, can it be considered legitimate according to 
Husserlian criteria. then, without any need for a reference to some power of ima-
gination ( Einbildungskraft), it is understood as the generic term for constitutions 
of sense (Kern, 1964, pp. 262 f.). these, in their passive and active modes, collec-
tively constitute rationality, or ‘understanding’ in a broad Husserlian sense, which 
includes both sensible and intellectual consciousness in the Kantian sense of the 
terms. in the light of these radically changed conditions, Husserl refers to the idea 
of a transcendental synthesis of the imagination as Kant’s idea of a ‘doubly functio-
ning understanding ( doppelt fungierenden Verstand)’ (Hua Vi, §§ 25 and 28).
doing away with Kant’s method and justificatory criteria, Husserl proceeds in 
what Kant would have considered an empirical fashion. Husserl, however, rejects 
the Kantian idea that a priori truths are ultimately based on a priori forms of cog-
nition and that the copernican revolution therefore leads back to purely formal 
conditions in the thinking subject. instead, he legitimizes his claims with the phe-
nomenological reduction, which he understands as “the Copernican Turn, enacted 
in its radical form” (Hua XXXiV, p. 55; see Hua Vii, p. 254), and with the eidetic 
variation, which enables Husserl to identify the essential (a priori) features of a 
phenomenon. this leads, of course, to a fundamentally different conception of the a 
priori. Hence, Husserl’s anti-representationalist account describes the essential fea-
tures of sense-formations in which (perceptual) transcendent objects are constituted 
as ‘them themselves’, albeit always only in relation to (perceiving) transcendental 
consciousness. this renders these objects mind-dependent in the (Husserlian) sense 
that they essentially require subjectivity as their correlate, not in the (Kantian) sense 
that their formal a priori features have their origin in subjective a priori forms of 
cognition.
3  Conclusion
many defenses of Husserl’s anti-representational realism have been published, espe-
cially (but not only) recently (ameriks, 1977; crowell, 2001; drummond, 1990; 
luft, 2011; moran, 2004; Zahavi, 2008, 2004 et al.). in a parallel development, 
there is also an increasing number of defenses of a realist, anti-representationalist 
reading of Kant, especially (but not only) recently (allais, 2011, 2007, 2004; alli-
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son, 2004; ameriks, 2000, 1992; collins, 1992 et al.). What we are seeing is the 
gradual realisation that realism is indeed, as both Kant and Husserl claimed, not 
only reconcilable with transcendental idealism, but its original task. Zahavi is right 
to suggest that “a useful way to interpret transcendental idealism is by defining it 
negatively as an anti-representationalist criticism of metaphysical realism” (Zahavi, 
2008, p. 364). However, as Zahavi admits, this is only, as he calls it, a ‘deflationary’ 
interpretation of transcendental idealism, and it is so broad that it fails to say much 
about what is characteristic of Kant’s or Husserl’s transcendental idealism in 
particular.
Here the comparison between the two alternative transcendental idealisms is in-
structive. it allows us to distinguish essential and non-essential features of transcen-
dental idealist approaches. this helps us to avoid quick equivocations and misinter-
pretations borrowed from different transcendental idealisms. moreover, it enables 
us to make explicit the specific conditions and implications of different versions 
thereof. ultimately, it frees us to critically investigate and perhaps even conceive of 
further alternative possibilities for transcendental philosophy in general or transcen-
dental idealism in particular.18
18 the completion of this article was made possible by a generous research leave granted by uni-
versity college cork.
